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HUMAN TRAFFICKING, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND FAIR TRIALS  
Tony Ward (Northumbria University) and Shahrzad Fouladvand (University of Sussex) 
  
Introduction  
Cases of human trafficking are frequently difficult to prosecute and raise a number of issues in 
the law of evidence. Human trafficking, now defined by the Modern Slavery Act 2015, s 2, 
involves arranging or facilitating the travel (to, from or within any country) of another person 
with a view to their being exploited; the exploitation may involve a sexual offence, servitude 
or forced labour, or otherwise coercing or deceiving the person into providing some service or 
benefit.1 According to a recent report by the National Audit Office (NAO), only 6% of the 
offences under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 recorded in the year to the end of March 2017 
resulted in a charge or summons. More than a quarter (27%) were recorded by the CPS ‘as 
having evidential difficulties’. The CPS and the police are reported to be investigating the 
reasons why cases are not meeting the evidential threshold for prosecution.2 Prosecutors 
interviewed by the NAO pointed to variable levels of investigation and case-building by the 
police and to difficulties in identifying perpetrators, gathering sufficient evidence, and ‘victims 
agreeing to act as witnesses and then being available for the trial’.3 
It is unclear how far the law of evidence, as opposed to the practical difficulties of 
evidence gathering, contributes to the difficulties of prosecuting human trafficking cases. In 
this article we identify several aspects of the law relating to character evidence, sexual history 
evidence, witness anonymity and hearsay which appear to raise potential difficulties in 
trafficking cases, or which have in fact done so in cases that have reached the Court of Appeal. 
Our starting point is a recognition of victims’ rights as an important factor in evidential 
decisions, coupled with an insistence that victims’ rights cannot trump the defendant’s right to 
a fair trial. We refer to victims’ rights not because we equate complainants with victims, but 
because it is actual victims, those whose human rights (particularly to freedom from servitude) 
have in fact been violated, who are the intended beneficiaries of these rights.4 Complainants 
who are not in fact victims also have some rights – for example that their lives should not be 
endangered – but they are primarily the unintended beneficiaries of the duties of the state 
towards victims. 
The body of this article is in two parts. The first discusses the position of the victim in 
relation to the investigation, prevention and prosecution of human trafficking, with particular 
                                                 
1 Modern Slavery Act 2015 ss 2, 3. 
2 National Audit Office, Reducing Modern Slavery (HC 630, 2017) para 4.9. 
3 Ibid, 4.10. 
4 Our use of the concept of a right accords with David Lyons’ ‘qualified beneficiary theory’: Rights, 
Welfare and Mill’s Moral Theory (OUP 1994), 29-30. 
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emphasis on the rights of trafficking victims, and victims in general, under human rights law 
and EU law. The second part considers the tensions that arise within the domestic law of 
evidence between the protection of (alleged) victims and the defendant’s right to a fair trial. 
We argue that protection of victims does not justify curtailing the rights of defendants to 
introduce evidence, or ask questions in cross-examination, of potentially substantial probative 
value, however distressing they may be. The protection of victims and witnesses does, 
however, justify a relatively flexible approach to the admission of hearsay evidence. There is 
a dearth of research on how the rules on hearsay – or most of the other rules we discuss – are 
applied in practice, either in trafficking cases or generally; but whether there is scope for more 
extensive use of hearsay in trafficking cases is perhaps the most important practical question 
raised by the discussion that follows. 
 
Part I: Victims and the Investigative Process 
An effective investigation by the police, and/or another agency such as the Gangmasters and 
Labour Abuse Authority,5 is needed to bring an offender to justice. Central to the success of 
human trafficking prosecutions is the involvement and cooperation of human trafficking 
victims as witnesses. Human trafficking is a covert crime which presents complex evidential 
issues. Victims of modern slavery and human trafficking, whether for sexual exploitation or 
labour, can be among the most vulnerable of witnesses, often belonging to socially excluded 
groups and requiring significant support. However, they are most often treated as the primary 
source of evidence, so that securing their cooperation plays an important role in a successful 
prosecution. Studies of law enforcement responses to human trafficking suggest that victim 
cooperation is central to the success of human trafficking prosecutions6 and is one of the most 
common challenges faced by law enforcement in the identification and investigation of human 
trafficking cases.7 The percentage of successful prosecutions for human trafficking offences 
shows that there was a rise in unsuccessful outcomes due to victim issues, from 31.1% in 2015–
16 to 43.9% in 2016–17. Subsequently, the number of human trafficking convictions fell from 
192 in 2015–16 to 181 in 2016–17.8 The UK’s Anti-Slavery Commissioner, Kevin Hyland, in 
his first annual report stated his concern that ‘From the limited data that is gathered on victims’ 
circumstances via the current NRM system through to compromised crime recording, a lack of 
                                                 
5 See e.g. ‘Trafficking Duo get Six Years Each After Joint Investigation’, http://www.gla.gov.uk/whats-
new/press-release-archive/180516-trafficking-brothers-get-six-years-each-after-joint-investigation/, 20 May 
2016 (accessed 4 Jan 2018) 
6 Frank Laczko and Marco A Gramegna, ‘Developing Better Indicators of Human Trafficking’ (2003) 
10 Brown J World Affairs 179. 
7 Heather J Clawson, Mary Layne and Kevonne Small, Estimating Human Trafficking into the United 
States: Development of a Methodology (Caliber: Fairfax, VA, 2006). 
8 HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (HMCPSI) Review of the CPS Response to the Modern 
Slavery Act 2015 (Dec 2017), para 2.8. 
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intelligence reporting and evidence-based operational action, victims both present and future 
are being failed.’9  This was reflected in HM Inspectorate of Constabulary’s report which 
stressed the urgent need to consider ‘victimless’ or ‘evidence-based’ prosecutions for modern 
slavery and human trafficking investigations for various reasons: most importantly that victims 
may be too vulnerable to support a prosecution.10 Building cases through evidence-based 
prosecutions without the cooperation of an alleged victim has been encouraged in the recent 
CPS Response to Modern Slavery Act11 although the report also acknowledges that ‘[t]here is 
no specific CPS legal or policy guidance on “victimless” prosecution for human trafficking, 
slavery and forced labour offences.’12  The Inspectorate’s report also highlighted the effective 
use of a wide range of investigative tools and techniques, particularly covert surveillance, 
through organised crime structures in order to dismantle the criminal networks but also to 
ensure victims are safeguarded.13  
Prosecution should be seen as part of a wider strategy against trafficking and 
exploitation, in which measures to reduce the demand for exploited labour (including the 
exploitation of sex workers) is a central element. The most promising approaches adopt a form 
of ‘responsibilisation strategy’, in which corporations, NGOs and individual citizens are, in 
Garland’s words, ‘persuaded to exert their informal powers of social control, and if necessary, 
to modify their usual practices, in order to help reduce criminal opportunities and enhance 
crime control’.14 In the criminological and sociological literature the concept of 
‘responsibilisation’ often has negative connotations, being viewed as part of a neo-liberal trend 
towards privatising functions that were formerly seen as belonging to the state.15 In the context 
of human trafficking, however, we would argue that such an approach represents a realistic 
                                                 
9 Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, Annual Report 2015-16, 42.  
10 HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), Stolen Freedom: The 
Policing Response to Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking (2017), 60.  
11 HMCPSI, n 8 above, para 1.4. 
12 Ibid, para 5.14.  
13 HMICFRS, n 10 above, paras 5.13-5.17. 
14 David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 126. See also, Shahrzad Fouladvand, ‘Decentering The Prosecution-Oriented Approach: 
Tackling Both Supply and Demand in the Struggle against Human Trafficking’ (2018) 52 International Journal 
of Law, Crime and Justice 129. 
15 See for example Jamie Bennett, ‘They Hug Hoodies, Don’t They? Responsibility, Irresponsibility and 
Responsibilisation in Conservative Crime Policy’ (2008) 47 Howard Jnl of Crim J 351; Antje Bednarek, 
‘Responsibility and the Big Society’ (2011) 16 (2) Sociological Research Online 17; Jo Mockeridge, 
‘Responsibilisation in the Youth Justice System: Repositioning Marginalised Knowledge’ in K Atkinson, A R 
Huber and K Tucker (eds) Voices of Resistance: Subjugated Knowledge and the Challenge to the Criminal Justice 
System (Liverpool John Moores University/EG Press, 2017). 
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understanding of the market-driven nature of the crime, as well as the important role of the 
voluntary sector in working with victims.16 
In this context, the main aim of ‘responsibilisation’ is to make the potential consumers 
of trafficked and exploited labour – from large corporations17 to individual buyers of sexual 
services18 – accept responsibility for their potential use of exploited labour. There is, however, 
a concern about the extent to which the state also holds victims themselves responsible for 
playing their part in the crime control process. For example Jo Goodey argues that, under some 
of the international legal instruments discussed below, ‘trafficking victims have a right to 
access criminal justice and social services, but only when they take on responsibilities to the 
State as witnesses.’ 19  It is a significant aspect of the ‘responsibilisation strategy’ that the police 
foster good relations with voluntary sector organisations working with victims with a view to 
those organisations encouraging their clients to provide intelligence to the police, and perhaps 
to become prosecution witnesses.20 The idea that victims and witnesses in general have 
responsibilities to the state is endorsed in one of the most important recent judgments on 
criminal evidence, R v Riat: ‘a degree of (properly supported) fortitude can legitimately be 
expected [of a fearful witness] in the fight against crime.’21 
For any such ‘responsibilisation of the victim’ to be acceptable it has to be coupled with 
a recognition of the victim as a bearer of rights which the state has a responsibility to uphold 
(whether or not the victim is a citizen of that state). In designating human trafficking as a form 
of ‘modern slavery’, Parliament has recognised it as an offence which violates individual rights 
in a fundamental way, indeed which denies the victim the status of a rights-bearing subject.22 
The idea that such a violation of the victim’s rights gives victims (or those credibly claiming 
to be so) certain rights in the legal process is, as we shall see, recognised in international and 
domestic law. The uncomfortable fact remains, however, that those victims who seek to 
vindicate their rights through the criminal justice process take on what may an extremely 
onerous role, and there are limits to the extent to which the state can reduce the burden on 
                                                 
16 Fouladvand, n 14 above. 
17 I.e. those with an annual turnover exceeding £36m, which are required to publish statements under the 
Modern Slavery Act 2015, s 54. 
18 See e.g. Sexual Offences Act 2003 s 53A.  
19 Jo Goodey, ‘Sex Trafficking in Women from Central and East European countries: Promoting a 
‘victim-centred’ and ‘women-centred’ approach to Criminal Justice intervention’ (2004) 76 Feminist Review 26.  
20 HMICFRS, n 10 above, 72.  
21 R v Riat [2012] EWCA Crim 1509, [16]. 
22 The claim that every offence of trafficking under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (which may involve 
only a short journey with some form exploitation in view) amounts to anything akin to chattel slavery is, however, 
problematic. See Julia O’Connell Davidson, Modern Slavery: The Margins of Freedom (Palgrave, 2015); 
Vladlislava Stoyanova ‘Dancing on the Borders of Article 4: Human Trafficking and the European Court of 
Human Rights in the Rantsev Case’ (2012) 30 NQHR 163. 
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witnesses while still respecting the rights of defendants. In the case of (alleged) human 
trafficking victims, the likelihood that they will suffer damaging attacks on their credibility is 
heightened by the fact that claiming to be a victim may have certain advantages, which can be 
portrayed as an incentive to false claims particularly to extend the support from National 
Referral Mechanism (NRM) beyond the 45 days recovery period23 and also to secure their right 
to remain in the UK. Moreover, victims may fail to conform to an ideal of pure, passive 
victimhood, but may, for example, have agreed to enter the country to work in the sex 
industry.24  
The UK has opted out of the EU Residence Permit Directive25 which purports to offer 
third-country nationals the opportunity to ‘cooperate freely and hence more effectively if their 
legal position in the country was assured’.26 As Roth puts it, the Directive in fact was an 
incentive for the victims to expose themselves to further risk from their traffickers and to other 
consequences, such as potential stigmatisation.27 Such an incentive can, in fact, treat 
traumatised victims of human trafficking as instruments of law enforcement to cooperate with 
the authorities in the investigations and criminal proceedings. 28   
 
Victims’ Rights and Due Process 
Following Doak, we can distinguish two types of victims’ rights: rights to protection and to 
participation.29 In a procedural or evidential context, the most important right of protection is 
a right to protection against secondary victimisation.  Rights to participation are enshrined, at 
least pending Brexit, in Directive 2012/29/EU (the ‘Victims Directive’)30, as the ‘right to be 
                                                 
23 Caroline Haughey, The Modern Slavery Act Review, (2016), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/modern-slavery-act-2015-review-one-year-on (accessed 15 Jan 
2018),  25.  
24 Goodey, n 19 above. 
25 Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004, OJ L 261/19 (6.8.2004).   
26 Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004, OJ L 261/19 (6.8.2004). Preamble, para 11. 
27  Venla Roth,  Defining Human Trafficking and Identifying its Victims: A Study on the Impact and 
Future Challenges of International, European and Finnish Legal Responses to Prostitution-Related Trafficking 
in Human Beings, (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 187.  
28 Ibid, 187.  
29 Jonathan Doak, Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice: Reconceiving the Role of Third 
Parties (Hart, 2008), Chs. 2-3. 
30 The Victims’ Directive sets out the basic rights afforded to victims of crime across the European Union 
and came into force on 16th November 2015. The revised Victims Code implements some provisions of the 
Directive: Ministry of Justice, Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (October 2015). 
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heard’. The Directive does not provide this right with much substantive content, but does 
recognise that it can be fulfilled by allowing the victim to make a written statement. 31 
In European human rights law, the key case on the rights of victims of trafficking is 
Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia. 32 The Strasbourg Court expounds the duties of states to afford 
protection against human trafficking as a form of slavery, servitude or forced labour within the 
scope of ECHR Art. 4. It also, albeit briefly, addresses victims’ rights to participation: 
Like arts 2 and 3, art.4 also entails a procedural obligation to investigate 
situations of potential trafficking. …. For an investigation to be effective, it 
must … be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of 
individuals responsible, an obligation not of result but of means. …. The 
victim or the next-of-kin must be involved in the procedure to the extent 
necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests.33 
In Rantsev the victim of trafficking was dead, and this may have encouraged the court 
to formulate the right by analogy with the rights of next of kin under Art. 2. As the 
‘investigation’ includes the whole process leading to punishment, it appears that the trial is an 
aspect of the process in which the victim has a right to be involved, to the extent necessary to 
safeguard her legitimate interest in establishing that her right has been violated.34 The 
obligations of states under Rantsev extend to any case where there is ‘a credible 
suspicion’ of human trafficking.35 
The UN Protocol on Trafficking in Persons36 provides, in Art. 6(2): 
Each State Party shall ensure that its domestic legal or administrative system 
contains measures that provide to victims of trafficking in persons, in 
appropriate cases… 
(b) Assistance to enable their views and concerns to be presented and 
considered at appropriate stages of criminal proceedings against offenders, 
in a manner not prejudicial to the rights of the defence. 
                                                 
31 Dir 2012/29 EU, preamble, para 41. 
32 (2010) 51 EHRR 1. 
33 Ibid, [288]. See also CN v UK (2013) 56 EHRR 54, [59]. 
34 See also Perez v France (2005) 40 EHRR 39, [72]; Gäfgen v Germany (2011) 52 EHRR 1, [116-9]; 
Vladislava Stoyanova, Human Trafficking and Slavery Reconsidered: Conceptual Limits and States’ Positive 
Obligations in European Law (Cambridge, CUP 2017) 368-9. 
35 Rantsev, (2010) 51 EHRR 1, [286]; CN (2013) 56 EHRR 54 [69-71]. 
36 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolTraffickingInPersons.aspx 
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While this wording is similar to the more general Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime,37 it goes further by requiring assistance, rather than merely 
allowing victims to express their views. The reference to ‘views’ is not exactly apt: what is 
important is that victims should able to communicate their experiences to the court and have 
them taken into respectful consideration. Special measures for vulnerable witnesses, admission 
of hearsay in certain circumstances, restrictions on impugning victims’ character or sexual 
offence complainants’ sexual history, can all be seen as protecting the ‘right to be heard’.38 
EU Directive 2011/36 ‘on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and 
protecting its victims’ focuses on the right to protection against secondary victimisation:  
Victims of trafficking who have already suffered the abuse and degrading treatment 
which trafficking commonly entails… should be protected from secondary 
victimisation and further trauma during the criminal proceedings. Unnecessary 
repetition of interviews during investigation, prosecution and trial should be avoided, 
for instance, where appropriate, through the production, as soon as possible in the 
proceedings, of video recordings of those interviews.39   
The EU Victims Directive is somewhat less specific, requiring only that interviews be 
kept to the minimum necessary.40  The latter Directive does, however, amount to a recognition 
that victims in general – defined as natural persons who have been harmed by crimes41  – have 
broadly similar rights to participation and protection. We can sum this up by saying that victims 
have a right to a fair opportunity to participate in a fair trial of anyone whom they and/or the 
state accuse of violating their rights. They also have a right that such a trial be conducted, so 
far as is consistent with fairness to the accused, in a way that minimises the risk of ‘secondary 
victimisation or further trauma’.42 These principles of effective participation and minimising 
former trauma also underlie Ellison and Munro’s recent view of criminal procedure through a 
‘trauma-informed lens’.43 The integration and recall of painful traumatic experiences and 
events is extremely complex, involving ‘chaotic, fragmented images, somatic affects, and 
bodily enactments’.44 Ellison and Munro focus on special measures for vulnerable witnesses 
                                                 
37 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, General Assembly 
Resolution 40/34, Annex (1985), https://www.unodc.org/pdf/compendium/compendium_2006_part_03_02.pdf, 
Art. 6(b). 
38 Directive 2012/29/EU, art 10.  
39 Directive 2011/36, art. 20. 
40 Directive 2012/29/EU, art 20. 
41 Ibid art 2(1)(a)(i); subpara (ii) extends to family members of homicide victims. 
42 See above, n 41. 
43 Louise Ellison and Vanessa E Munro ‘Taking Trauma Seriously’ (2017) 21 E&P 183. 
44 Yoram Yovell, ‘From hysteria to post traumatic stress disorder: Psychoanalysis and the neurobiology 
of traumatic memories’ (2000) 2 Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 171. 
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and the judicial control of cross-examination, but the goal of enabling victims to be involved 
in proceedings without secondary victimisation or further trauma raises a wider range of 
evidential issues.  
As we shall illustrate with respect to human trafficking proceedings, the measures that 
help to secure the victim’s right to participate in the legal process include not only special 
measures but the use of written or recorded statements as hearsay evidence. They also include 
restrictions on non-defendants’ bad character and sexual history evidence to the extent that 
these protect complainants against being unfairly discredited, rendering their participation in 
proceedings ineffective. The protection of victims against secondary victimisation and further 
trauma is a further justification for these rules, as well as more general control of cross-
examination. Any move towards a more victim-centred, trauma-sensitive approach therefore 
has implications not just for courtroom procedure but also for the core rules of evidence law.    
Identifying and interviewing victims 
Before any question of a victim giving evidence arises, the first hurdle is to identify the 
individual as a victim of human trafficking and to remove them from harm. Victims who come 
into contact with the police are not always recognised as such and therefore remain in the hands 
of those who are exploiting them. Others are arrested as offenders or illegal immigrants. 45   
Identifying victims is particularly difficult because many victims are reluctant to work 
with state authorities in order to obtain service and assistance out of fear and lack of trust, 
preferring to work with NGOs, some of which do not have full capabilities to meet victims’ 
due to funding. Victims often choose not to identify themselves as victims, which thus 
disenfranchises them from access to state services and protection.46 Reasons for this reluctance, 
amongst others, may include: threats made to the victim or to his or her family; concerns about 
immigration status; wariness of authorities based on the victims’ previous experiences in their 
home countries.47 Korzinski describes how traffickers ‘force the victim into a position of 
isolated helplessness….completely reliant on the trafficker for her survival’.48 As a result of 
psychological manipulation, victims may remain with their exploiters for long periods without 
                                                 
45 See HMICRFRS, n 10 above, 60.    
46 Ella Cockbain and Helen Brayley-Morris, ‘Human Trafficking and Labour Exploitation in the Casual 
Construction Industry: An Analysis of Three Major Investigations in the UK Involving Irish Traveller Offending 
Groups’ (2017) Policing (advance articles) https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pax032, 14; Andrea Sölkner, Needs 
Assessment of the National Referral Mechanism for Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings in Ukraine: 
Assessment Report.’ https://kidsempowerment.org/needs-assessment-of-the-national-referral-mechanism-for-
victims-of-trafficking-in-human-beings-in-ukraine-assessment-report. (accessed 6 Feb 2018) 
47 See HMICFRS, n 10 above, 16.   
48 Michael Korzinski, ‘Identifying and Responding to Trauma in Victims of Trafficking and Exploitation’ 
in Parosha Chandran (ed) Human Trafficking Handbook (LexisNexis, 2011),  71. 
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attempting to escape or alert the authorities, and the defence may present such behaviour as 
evidence that no exploitation has occurred.49 
Following an effective identification system, victims’ human rights should be 
protected50 and they should be entitled to support and protectives measure(s) provided by the 
state. Supporting victims is a challenging task particularly during the recovery and reflection 
period.51   
One of the main challenges law enforcement faces in investigating human trafficking 
cases is that the victim’s or witness’s distrust of law enforcement may lead to ineffective 
interviews where the interviewer does not  fully understand the problem.52 A covert 
investigation might be conducted to utilise cooperating witnesses or informants. However, law 
enforcement authorities should ensure proper procedures and investigative technique in order 
to obtain credible information and evidence and protect victims.53  
A comprehensive criminal justice response to human trafficking should include 
measures for the protection and support of trafficked victims alongside measures to prosecute 
human traffickers. Victim protection and support policy measures should not be conditional on 
a trafficked victims’ willingness to cooperate with law enforcement officers in their criminal 
investigations, which to a greater or lesser extent it appears to be in some instances. Victims of 
human trafficking are often reluctant to cooperate in a criminal investigation due to their fear 
of the traffickers and lack of alternatives to the trafficking situation, distrust of law enforcement 
and feelings of shame.54 It is in this context where unreliable evidence given by the victim 
makes it hard for the prosecution to prove the elements of the trafficking crime and to secure 
the right punishment in relation to the severity of the crime that offenders have committed.55  
Testai’s study in Italy suggests that there should be alternatives to victim protection policies or 
to get testimony from them based on a genuine human rights approach which would not link 
                                                 
49 Cockbain and Brayley-Morris, n 49 above, 14.  
50 OSCE/ODIHR, (2004) Guiding Principles on Human Rights in the Return of Trafficked Persons, 
Published by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), available at 
www.osce.org/odihr/124268?download=true  
51 See for example Margaret Malloch and Paul Rigby (eds) Human Trafficking: The Complexities of 
Exploitation (Edinburgh University Press, 2016). 
52 Bradley W. Orsini, ‘Law Enforcement Considerations for Human Trafficking’ in Mary C. Burke (ed)  
Human Trafficking: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, (Routledge 2013), 197.   
53 Ibid, 200.  
54 Amy Farrell et al., Identifying Challenges to Improve the Investigation and Prosecution of State and 
Local Human Trafficking Cases (NIJ: Washington DC, 2012) 107. 
55 United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT), 2008. From Protection to 
Prosecution- A Strategic Approach. www.un.org/ga/president/62/ThematicDebates/humantrafficking/ebook.pdf 
(accessed 15 Jan 2018). 
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protection to witness’ testimony but would effectively give them access to a range of services 
to recover and reintegrate into the society.56    
The obligation to identify victims of human trafficking is contained in the Principles 
and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking adopted by the UN Economic and 
Social Council in 2002. Principle 8 requires States to ‘ensure that trafficked persons are 
protected from further exploitation and harm and have access to adequate physical and 
psychological care [which] shall not be made conditional on the capacity or willingness of 
trafficked persons to cooperate in legal proceedings’.57 Under Articles 24 and 25 of the UN 
Convention Against Organised Crime (UNCTOC),58 state parties are obligated to provide 
‘effective protection’ as well as ‘assistance’ to victims and witnesses of organised crime 
offences covered by the Convention. The measures should protect witnesses from threats, 
intimidation or bodily injury, with a full witness protection programme to be put in place as a 
last resort.59 The UN Human Trafficking Protocol and Council of Europe Convention on 
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings also highlight the importance of assisting victims 
of trafficking and also, as we have seen, afford some recognition of their procedural rights.  
Article 27 (1) of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human 
Beings provides that States shall ensure that investigation into and prosecution of offences 
under the Anti-Trafficking Convention are ‘not dependent upon the report or accusation made 
by a victim, at least when the offence was committed in whole or in part on its territory’. The 
more prosecutions can be ‘evidence led,’60 that is, based on evidence other than the victims’ 
testimony, including undercover operations61 or covert surveillance, the better the prospect of 
securing convictions without causing further trauma to victims. In practice, however, the 
                                                 
56 Patrizia Testai, ‘Victim Protection Policy in a Local Context: A Case Study’ in Mary C. Burke (ed)  
Human Trafficking: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, (Routledge 2013), 207. It is worth mentioning here (from the 
same source) that the principle of ‘victim protection’ was established in Italy through Article 18 of the Italian 
immigration law (Law Decree n. 286/1998), which grants a residence permit for ‘reasons of social protection’ to 
foreign individuals who are administratively defined as victims of trafficking.  
57 Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking, Report of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. E/2002/68/Add.1. 
58 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General Assembly 
resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000 and entered into force on 29 September 2003. 
59 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2012. Victim Assistance and Witness 
Protection. www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/witness-protection.html (accessed 15 Jan 2018). 
60 HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, Increasingly Everyone's Business: A Progress Report on the Police 
Response to Domestic Abuse (2015), 94-8. 
61 Bradley W. Orsini, ‘Law Enforcement Considerations for Human Trafficking’ in Mary C. Burke (ed)  
Human Trafficking: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, (Routledge 2013), 201.  
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difficulty of mounting such operations may make heavy reliance on victim testimony 
unavoidable.62 
Article 10 of the CoE Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, 
obliges each state party to identify and support victims through a National Referral Mechanism 
(NRM) which is in fact a process of ‘locating and identifying potential victims of trafficking’.63 
In the UK, potential victims of human trafficking will be assessed by a competent authority to 
decide whether there are reasonable grounds to believe they are victims of modern slavery or 
human trafficking.64 If a positive decision is reached the individual will be able to benefit from 
protection and support services for a 45 day ‘Recovery and Reflection’ period during which 
the CA will investigate the individual’s case and come to a conclusive decision as to whether 
the individual is a victim of trafficking.  The purpose of this reflection period is to help 
individuals to recover from their ordeal and they should be given the information about their 
future options, which can include choosing to return home or assisting the UK police in their 
enquiries to prosecute their traffickers. Reflection periods, therefore, have the potential to 
create an environment that encourages victim cooperation in the prosecution of traffickers.  
If a CA decides an individual is not a victim of trafficking then the prosecution would 
be unlikely to use them as a witness as their credibility would be questioned by the defence.  
The absence of a formal right of appeal for trafficking victims who receive a negative 
conclusive grounds decision has been criticised as being inconsistent with the right to an 
effective remedy guaranteed by ECHR art. 13.65 The most recent US State Department 
Trafficking in Persons Report stated that 
Although the [UK] government meets the minimum standards, the victim 
identification and referral system, did not consistently assist all those 
requiring help, and the quality of care varied between jurisdictions in the UK. 
The government did not always ensure victim care following a 45-day 
                                                 
62 Cockbain and Brayley-Morris, n 49 above, 15. 
63 The UK National Referral Mechanism for victims of human trafficking is under review and changes 
to the NRM have been piloted in West Yorkshire police force area and the South West from 3rd August 2015. 
The outcome of these have not been published yet.  
64 These can be referred by ‘first responders’ (such as the UK police, UK Borders Agency (UKBA), and 
certain Non-Government Organisations (NGOs); for instance the Salvation Army or Barnardo’s, to one of two 
Competent Authorities (CA): the National Crime Agency’s (NCA) Modern Slavery Human Trafficking Unit 
(MSHTU) or the Home Office Visas and Immigration (UKVI). The CA will then determine whether there are 
‘reasonable grounds’ to suspect that the individual is a victim of trafficking.  See 
http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/specialist-capabilities/uk-human-trafficking-
centre/national-referral-mechanism (accessed 15 Jan 2018). 
65 Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group, Wrong Kind of Victim (2010) 
www.ecpat.org.uk/Handlers/Download.ashx?IDMF=9b1a0aa4-8645-4d61-ade8-e5e7257ddc98 (accessed 12 Jan 
2018). 
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reflection period, after which authorities in many cases deported foreign 
victims who were not assisting in an investigation and prosecution.66  
In cases of trafficking in persons, statements by victims are often inconsistent or even 
include outright falsehoods.67 While in general the consistency of a witness statement will be 
an important element for courts to consider in their assessment of credibility, in cases of 
trafficking, inconsistencies may arise from a range of reasons other than lack of credibility 
including lapses in memory, confusion about the chain of events or traumatic reactions.68 It is 
well-documented that trafficking victims will often recount inconsistent stories as a result of 
the trauma they have experienced, a fear of the authorities and/or the repercussions of speaking 
out which present some unique barriers to the investigation of human traffickers.69 The fear a 
victim may have in assisting the law enforcement officers could be enormous. For instance, the 
fear from the traffickers that might harm victims’ family members in their home country; 
shame, particularly, for the victims of sexual exploitation who were forced into prostitution; 
self-blame and guilt that prevent them from leaving the trafficking situation which contribute 
to their inability to recall the exact details of their victimisation.70  
As mentioned above, the reflection period plays an important role in the recovery of 
victims; however, this has been also a contentious issue for some CoE member states which 
view it as a potential ‘pull factor’ for illegal immigration. It is feared that some illegal 
immigrants may make false claims of being trafficked in order to receive the benefits of 
protection and support offered to ‘genuine’ victims of trafficking.71 For example, in the UK 
under the NRM, as a result of obligations under the Trafficking Convention (Article 14 (1) (b)), 
a victim of trafficking may be granted ‘discretionary leave to remain’ (DLR) for a period of up 
to one year if they are assisting the authorities in their criminal investigations. Although 
potential victims are under no obligation to cooperate with the police in their investigations72  
however, by remaining in the UK the police and legal professionals involved in the criminal 
                                                 
66 US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2017, 411-2 
https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2017/ (accessed 12 Jan 2018). 
67 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), ‘Evidential issues in Trafficking in Persons 
Cases’ 2017   www.unodc.org/documents/human-
trafficking/2017/Case_Digest_Evidential_Issues_in_Trafficking.pdf (accessed 15 Jan 2018). 
68 Johanna Lindholm, Ann-Christen Cederborg and Charlotte Alm, ‘Adolescent girls exploited in the sex 
trade: informativeness and evasiveness in investigative interviews’ (2014) 16 Police Practice and Research: An 
International Journal 197. 
69 e.g. Cockbain and Brayley-Morris, n 49 above 
70 Elizabeth Hopper, ‘Underidentification of Human Trafficking Victims in the United States’ (2004) 5 
Journal of Social Work Research and Evaluation, 125-136. 
71 UN.GIFT, n 58 above. 
72 Home Office, United Kingdom Borders Agency, 2010. Victims of Trafficking: Guidance for 
Competent Authorities. 106. www.gov.uk/government/publications/victims-of-trafficking-guidance-for-
competent-bodies (accessed 15 Jan 2018). 
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investigation will have easier access to the victims to obtain evidence while the victims can 
benefit from the provided support necessary for their recovery. This is an area which the 
defence can attempt to weaken the prosecution’s case by claiming that the victim was 
incentivised to assist the police by the promise of DLR.  
An important question here is: how can the ‘genuine’ and ‘deserving’ victim be 
distinguished from the ‘fraudulent’ or ‘undeserving’? According to O’Connell Davidson this 
binary is particularly salient in the depiction of the ‘trafficking victim’, mainly victims of 
sexual exploitation. 73 Both the ‘genuine’ victim of evil sex traffickers and the ‘bogus’ victim 
playing the system can serve as part of the rhetoric justifying state coercion against migrants 
and sex workers. 74 As an example of the latter, it has been reported that a growing number of 
pregnant Albanian women who pay criminal gangs to smuggle them into Britain are falsely 
claiming to be sex trafficking victims to gain asylum. Anthony Steen, the UK's former special 
envoy on human trafficking, claimed that ‘while the number of claims from Albanian women 
who claim to have been sex trafficked had reached a record high, government investigations 
found most cases were fabricated’.75 Whatever the ideological uses of the genuine/fabricated 
binary, it is one that courts cannot avoid when the evidence of alleged victims is challenged. 
The courts are seemingly willing to challenge expert evidence which simply recounts the 
testimony of alleged trafficking victims, and NRM decisions regarding such status are not 
binding on the court.76  
Notwithstanding such anxieties, courts in various jurisdictions have been ready to 
accept the evidence of complainants despite, or even because of, inconsistencies in their 
evidence which can be attributed to intimidation.77  The recent UNODC report on Evidential 
Issues in Trafficking in Persons Cases78 gives examples from a range of jurisdictions.  
                                                 
73 Julia O’Connell Davidson, ‘New Slavery, Old Binaries: Human Trafficking and the Borders of 
“Freedom”’ (2010) 10 Global Networks 244. 
74 Margaret Malloch and Paul Rigby, (eds.) Human Trafficking: The Complexities of Exploitation, 
(Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press), p. 183. 
75 http://news.trust.org//item/20141110172225-y5yir/  
76 See R v Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36. 
77 The US State Department urges prosecutors to see ‘a reluctant or untruthful witness as … evidence of 
the trafficker’s success in controlling the victim’: Trafficking in Persons Report 2017, n 69 above, 7. 
78 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Evidential issues in Trafficking in Persons 
Cases’ (2017) available at 
 www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2017/Case_Digest_Evidential_Issues_in_Trafficking.pdf 
(accessed 12 Jan 2018). 
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In many cases the argument that inconsistencies in a complainant’s testimony can best 
be explained as effects of their victimisation is a perfectly reasonable one.79 Before it is 
accepted as a basis for conviction, however, fairness demands that the defence have ample 
opportunity to advance the alternative explanation that the complainant is inconsistent because 
she or he is lying. This raises difficult questions about just how far the defence need to be 
allowed to go. Do they have to be able to question a witness about every single untruth or 
inconsistency, or does that pose too great a risk of secondary victimisation or of unfairly 
discrediting the complainant, particularly where the factfinder is a lay jury inexperienced in the 
effects of trauma? In cases such as Rehman80  and Jonas,81 discussed below, trial judges have 
protected complainants against what they saw as unduly repetitive or detailed questioning, and 
these restrictions have been upheld on appeal.  
Further difficulties arise from the process of interviewing complainants, particularly 
when these interviews, conducted in accordance with ABE (Achieving Best Evidence) 
guidelines, are used as witness’s evidence in chief.82 Specialist-trained interviewers in line with 
ABE guidance will interview victims wishing to support prosecution in order to obtain 
statements and intelligence regarding offender methods before relocation occurs through the 
NRM.83   
According to Kaur,84 due to the trauma they have experienced and feelings of shame 
and fear, their testimony is often disjointed and a full account of their experiences may only 
come to light over a course of follow up interviews.85 This can be difficult to present to a jury. 
The CPS Inspectorate ‘were told of lengthy incoherent accounts, with or without interpreters, 
provided by way of ABE that could not be used [as evidence in chief], being too long and too 
unwieldy to edit.’86 Multiple interviews are often necessary to build trust and rapport between 
law enforcement and traumatized victims. However, multiple interviews can have the reverse 
effect of re-traumatizing victims rather than creating trust and ultimately cooperation in a case 
against the perpetrator.87 In a US study, Warpinski acknowledges that trafficking victims can 
                                                 
79 On the acceptance of testimony as a form of inference to the best explanation, see Axel Gelfert, A 
Critical Introduction to Testimony (Bloomsbury, 2014), 136-42. 
80 R v Rehman, Rasheed and Ali [2017] EWCA Crim 106. 
81 R v Jonas [2015] EWCA Crim 562. 
82 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, s 27. 
83 HMICFRS, n 10 above, 71. 
84 Kalvir Kaur, ‘Obtaining Evidence from Traumatised Trafﬁcked Persons’, in Parosha Chandran (ed) 
Human Trafficking Handbook: Recognising Trafficking and Modern-Day Slavery in the UK (London, LexisNexis 
Butterworth, 2011), 103. 
85 ibid., 
86 HMCPSI, n 8 above, para 6.9. 
87 Farrell, n 57 above, 124. 
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be challenging for prosecutors to work with, by depriving them of voice, choice, and validation, 
but she found that judges were concerned about secondary victimisation by prosecutors.88  
The Court of Appeal has grappled with some of these issues in Rehman,89 a case of 
rape, trafficking and sexual activity with a child. The complainant was a 13-year old girl and 
the ABE interviews with her lasted, depending on which of two passages in the Court of Appeal 
judgment is correct, either 10½ hours or at least 13 hours.90 The prosecution acknowledged 
‘that in the first interviews she told many lies and concocted detailed but false stories. They 
relied on the last interviews, in which she described offences committed by the appellants’.91 
The judge agreed that only the interviews – 8 hours in length – on which the prosecution relied 
should be played to the jury as the complainant’s evidence in chief. The jury was also provided 
with a 20-minute excerpt from the earlier interviews, and a summary of the lies and 
inconsistencies in these interviews. In upholding these decisions, the Court of Appeal remarked 
that it was not necessary for every previous inconsistent statement to be put to such a vulnerable 
witness, either by questioning or by playing the interview. The combination of admissions by 
the prosecution, the excerpt from the earlier interviews, and questions put to the complainant 
in cross-examination had given the jury ‘sufficient detail of the lies told and sufficient material 
to show C’s demeanour’.92  
As far as we can tell from the limited detail in the judgment, this seems a fair approach 
in that it avoids making the evidence needlessly confusing while communicating clearly to the 
jury the decision they have to make between two competing explanations of the complainant’s 
lies. There was, however, one particular lie by the complainant which was kept from the jury 
for reasons that exemplify the difficult legal issues discussed below. 
Part II: Trafficking Victims and the Law of Evidence 
Decisions to exclude certain defence evidence or lines of questioning, or to allow alleged 
victims’ testimony to be given anonymously or by way of hearsay statements, raise difficult 
issues about how to reconcile the rights of victims with those of defendants. We shall explore 
four of these issues: evidence of the complainant’s bad character; sexual history evidence; 
anonymous evidence; and hearsay evidence from complainants ostensibly in fear. 
                                                 
88 Sarah Warpinski, Know Your Victim: A Key to Prosecuting Human Trafficking Offenses (2013), 
https://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/king/222/ (accessed 15 Jan 2018) 22.  
89 R v Rehman, Rasheed and Ali [2017] EWCA Crim 106. 
90 Ibid [5], [25]. 
91 Ibid, [5]. 
92 Ibid, [53] 
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Bad Character 
Senior Investigating Officers interviewed by Cockbain and Brayley-Morris expressed concern 
about the volume of ‘bad character’ evidence that had to be disclosed on victims and its 
potential to undermine witness credibility.93 Cross-examination can be a painful and traumatic 
experience for vulnerable witnesses, including victims of offences such as human trafficking. 
It can undermine the right to be heard, if it prejudices a jury to such an extent that they do not 
fairly hear what the witness has to say. Cross-examination is often combined with attacks on a 
witness’s character. The Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 100, restricts the circumstances in which 
evidence of bad character can be used to discredit a victim, but it allows such evidence where 
it is of ‘substantial probative value’.  So although trial judges can shield complainants from the 
distress, and unfair undermining of their credibility, that could result from gratuitous ‘mud-
slinging’, the need to allow the defence to air any legitimate ground for reasonable doubt sets 
an important limit to such protection. 
In the Rehman case discussed above,94 it is strongly arguable that the trial judge 
overstepped this limit when he excluded evidence that the teenage complainant had previously 
made what she admitted was a false allegation of abduction against a young man she regarded 
as her ‘boyfriend’.  It seems hard to deny that the probative value of this evidence was 
substantial. The defence case was that once again the complainant was falsely alleging serious 
crime by ‘boyfriends’ with whom she had fallen out. The evidence of the previous case would 
have shown that this was not just a crude appeal to a ‘rape myth’, but a claim that the 
complainant had followed an unusual pattern of behaviour that she had adopted in the past.  
Once it is accepted that bad character evidence has substantial probative value, there is 
no discretion to exclude it.95 From a victim-centred perspective this is unfortunate but, we 
submit, unavoidable. There cannot be a fair trial where the defendant is barred from adducing 
evidence of substantial probative value. The Court of Appeal in Rehman nevertheless held that 
the exclusion of this evidence was ‘within the bounds of legitimate discretion’.96 If the court 
was using discretion in the strong sense this cannot be right, but it is more likely that what they 
meant by discretion is that whether the probative value of the evidence is substantial is a fact-
sensitive judgment with which the Court of Appeal is reluctant to interfere. While the concern 
of both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal to minimise the distress of a vulnerable young 
witness are commendable, their decisions stretch the legitimate boundaries of fact-sensitive 
judgment. 
                                                 
93 n 49 above, 14. 
94 [2017] EWCA Crim 186. For more on the aspects discussed here see Tony Ward, ‘Vulnerable 
Witnesses, ABE Interviews and Bad Character’ (2017) 82 J Crim L 244. 
95 R v Dizaei [2013] EWCA Crim 88; [2013] 1 Cr App R 31, [35].  
96 [2017] EWCA Crim 186, [55]. 
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Sexual history 
Whatever the imperfections of its drafting,97 the overall aims of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999, s 41, align with the view of victims’ rights outlined above. It protects ‘the 
right of complainants not to be subjected to unnecessary humiliation and distress when giving 
evidence’.98 By protecting complainants against marginally relevant but potentially 
prejudicial99 attacks on their credibility, it helps to protect their ‘right to be heard’. At the same 
time, s 41(2)(b) allows evidence of the complainant’s sexual history to be admitted where its 
exclusion ‘might have the effect of rendering unsafe a conclusion of the jury … on any relevant 
issue in the case.’  What is problematic about s 41 is that, but for its creative interpretation (or 
rewriting) by the House of Lords,100 it would exclude evidence that might render a conclusion 
unsafe but did not fall within any of the narrowly defined categories of admissible evidence it 
sets out. A neglected aspect of s 41 is its application to human trafficking for the purposes of 
sexual exploitation,101 and a number of other offences related to sex work, such as controlling 
prostitution. Here too, the rigid wording of the section is a potential source of difficulty. 
One issue, which arose in the Rehman case discussed above, is that while evidence that 
a witness has previously made a false allegation of sexual behaviour does not in itself constitute 
evidence of sexual behaviour, it may be impossible to introduce or challenge the evidence 
without raising issues of sexual behaviour. In Rehman the complainant had admitted making a 
false allegation of abduction against her ‘boyfriend’, a term that could denote a merely romantic 
relationship (especially given the youth of both parties) but had sexual connotations. The 
prosecution would have wished to point out that the ‘boyfriend’ had admitted to sexually 
touching the under-age complainant, and they would have been free to do so as s. 41 does not 
apply to prosecution evidence, although there is a strong argument that it should be extended 
to curb unnecessarily intrusive prosecution questioning.102  
For the reasons given above, we submit that this evidence ought to have been admitted, 
but in a way that kept its distressing and intrusive nature to a necessary minimum. All that was 
                                                 
97 See for example Mike Redmayne, ‘Myths, relationships and Coincidences: The New Problems of 
Sexual History’ (2003) 7 E&P 75; Paul Roberts and Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (2nd ed, OUP 2010), 
458-52; Brian Brewis, Sexual Behaviour Evidence: A Critical Examination of Section 41 of the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (unpublished PhD thesis, Northumbria University, 2017). 
98 R v A (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 45, [51] per Lord Hope. 
99 For reasons given by Redmayne, n 100 above, ‘marginally relevant’ will often be a more accurate term 
than ‘irrelevant’; but cf Clare McGlynn, ‘Rape Trials and Sexual History Evidence: Reforming the Law on Third-
Party Evidence (2017) 81(5) J Crim L 367. 
100 R v A (No 2) [2002] 1 AC 45 
101 YJCEA 1999 s 62(1)(b) 
102 Liz Kelly, Jennifer Temkin and Sue Giffiths, Section 41: an Evaluation of New Legislation Limiting 
Sexual History Evidence in Rape Trials (Home Office Research Report 20/06, 2006), 13, 76.  
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relevant to the issue in Rehman was the intense emotional relationship implied by the word 
‘boyfriend,’ in the context of which the complainant had supposedly concocted her allegations,  
and there was no good reason for either the defence or the prosecution to invade the 
complainant’s privacy by asking about any sexual contact between her the man concerned. In 
this respect s 41 is arguably not restrictive enough. The Court of Appeal should not, however, 
have used the fact that s 41 could raise difficult issues as a reason for excluding the potentially 
significant evidence of the false allegation.  
Another issue about sexual history that can arise in trafficking cases is illustrated by 
Jonas.103 The two complainants in this case gave evidence that they had been forced to work 
as prostitutes in Hungary before being trafficked to England where further enforced prostitution 
awaited them. The defence challenged the portrayal of the women as passive victims, claiming 
that they had freely chosen to become prostitutes and to move to England; the defendants had 
merely helped them to ply their chosen trade in a new location. The trial judge imposed 
restrictions on the cross-examination of the women about their lives in Hungary; these were 
upheld on appeal as legitimate measures to protect vulnerable witnesses. 
For reasons that are not entirely clear, no issue under s 41 appears to have been raised, 
although any defence questioning about the complainants’ careers as sex workers was 
undoubtedly within the scope of the section. It was probably assumed that as they had given 
evidence in chief about the nature of their past experience as prostitutes, the defence were 
entitled to seek to rebut it under s 41(5).  The difficulty with this view is that it overlooks the 
requirement under s 41(6) that any questioning or evidence must relate to a ‘specific instance’ 
of past sexual behaviour. According to the Court of Appeal in White, the mere fact that a 
woman has a history of paid sex work, or even that she has convictions for prostitution offences 
at specific times and places is not a sufficiently specific allegation of sexual behaviour to be 
admitted under s. 41.104 Rather, ‘there must be something about the circumstances of a specific 
episode of alleged sexual conduct by a complainant which has potential probative force’.105 
The issue in White was whether the mere fact of having worked as prostitute had probative 
force under s 41(3). It is a different question whether such evidence can, in certain cases, have 
probative force under s 41(5).  Evidence that the complainants’ sex work in Hungary had been 
freely chosen would have probative force in rebutting their accounts of being trafficked to 
England against their will and compelled to work under the control of the defendants. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how such questions could be confined to specific instances 
of sexual behaviour, unless the defence were in a position to ask about individual clients.  
                                                 
103 [2016] EWCA Crim 37. 
104 R v White [2004] EWCA Crim 946. 
105 Ibid. [16]. Arguably this adds ‘a gloss that Parliament had not intended’ to s 41(6): Brewis, n 100 
above, 135. See also Peter FG Rook and Robert Ward, Sexual Offences: Law and Practice (6th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2016)1464 n 175. 
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Rook and Ward describe s 41(6) as a rock ‘lurking beneath the surface’ of s 41 and 
threatening the fairness of trials,106 and this is one instance where the metaphor seems right. 
Section 41(6) is intended to exclude general allegations of promiscuity in rape trials. In some 
human trafficking cases it may need to be very broadly construed in order to comply with the 
Human Rights Act by admitting evidence essential to a fair trial, as the House of Lords did in 
R v A107 in respect of s. 41(3).   
This does not render s 41 nugatory as a protection for human trafficking victims. Even 
under a broad interpretation of s 41(6), leave should be given to question alleged victims about 
their sexual history only to the extent that ‘a refusal of leave might have the result of rendering 
unsafe a conclusion of the jury ... on any relevant issue in the case’ (s 41(2)(b)). This might 
have been invoked in Jonas as a further basis for some of the restrictions on questioning that 
the judge imposed (although much of the questioning was only obliquely related to their sex 
lives). The defence must, however, be given reasonable scope to challenge the portrayal of the 
complainant as a passive victim of exploitation. 
In both the areas we have considered, s 41(2)(b) emerges as the key to a fair 
interpretation of the law. This is no accident: s 41(2)(b) encapsulates the law’s attempt to 
combine the defendant’s right to a fair trial with the complainant’s rights to privacy, to effective 
participation in the trial (which can be fatally undermined by unfair attacks on her credibility) 
and to protection against secondary victimisation. To allow as much questioning as is necessary 
to ensure a safe verdict, and no more, is the most reasonable way to combine these goals. If 
Parliament had trusted judges to apply this principle fairly, the rest of s 41 would have been 
unnecessary. On the assumption that judges are now more sensitive to the needs of victims and 
the dangers of ‘rape myths’ than they were in the 1990s,108 a broad test of ‘substantial probative 
value’ may be preferable to the intricacies of s 41.109  
 
Anonymity and risk 
One of the most important and familiar cases on the rights of victims in criminal proceedings 
is Doorson v Netherlands, where the ECtHR pointed out that although ECHR art 6 does not 
specifically protect victims and witnesses, their rights to life, liberty, security of the person and 
privacy are protected by other articles of the Convention and ‘principles of fair trial also require 
that in appropriate cases the interests of the defence are balanced against those of witnesses or 
                                                 
106 Ibid, 26.178. 
107 [2001] UKHL 25; [2002] 1 AC 45. 
108 Brewis, n 100 above. 
109 Cf. McGlynn, n 102 above, 388, arguing for a test, modelled on Canadian and Scots law, of significant 
probative value not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the administration of justice. 
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victims called upon to testify’.110 There was no suggestion that the applicants had personally 
threatened any of the witnesses but the Court accepted that, ‘Regard must be had to the fact, as 
established by the domestic courts and not contested by the applicant, that drug dealers 
frequently resorted to threats or actual violence against persons who gave evidence against 
them.’111 
Thus it appears that to justify the use of anonymous witnesses under art. 6, or other 
measures that limit the accused’s right of confrontation, it can be sufficient to show that the 
type of crime with which the defendants are charged is such that if they are involved in it, there 
may be a real danger to the witness. This approach sensibly avoids any suggestion that the court 
is prejudging whether the defendants are, in fact, involved in that type of crime.  
In considering a witness anonymity order under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 
88(3), it appears legitimate to take a similar approach. It is well established that human 
traffickers often resort to threats or violence, not only against witnesses themselves but against 
family members in their countries of origin.112 The Court of Appeal stressed in Mayers that the 
word ‘necessary’ imports a high standard of proof – it is debateable whether this is equivalent 
to the criminal standard113 – but evidence that the witness or his/her family would be in grave 
danger if their evidence were true could well meet this standard. Unfortunately in many cases 
the identity of the witness is likely to be known to the defendants. In other cases, the fact that 
the defendants may have a very strong suspicion of who the witness is does not preclude its 
being ‘necessary’ to avoid confirming their suspicions.114 
 
Hearsay and fear 
The position is not so simple where the prosecution seeks to adduce hearsay evidence on the 
ground that a witness is ‘in fear’. Unlike the anonymous witness provisions, CJA 2003 s. 116(1) 
(e) requires two findings of fact about the mental state of the witness: that she is in fear, and 
that the fear is the cause of her failure to give oral evidence (at all or in response to particular 
questions). It does not require that the fear have any objective basis, but some evidence of such 
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112 M. Hossain Zimmerman and Cathy Watts, ‘Human Trafficking and Health: A Conceptual Model to 
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a basis is needed to justify resorting to hearsay under ECHR art, 6.115 According to the Court 
of Appeal in Shabir, when it is the prosecution that seeks to rely on hearsay evidence they must 
prove both these matters to the criminal standard.116 Where it is the defence that adduces the 
hearsay evidence the standard is presumably the civil one, as it was under CJA 1988.117  
The dilemma that this high standard of proof creates in human trafficking cases is 
obvious. Genuine victims of trafficking, as we have seen, are often in great and well-founded 
fear, and the law should enable their evidence to be admitted in cases where they cannot be 
persuaded to attend court (or submit to video recorded cross-examination under YJCEA s. 28, 
which as yet, except in three Crown Courts,118 is available only for children and witnesses with 
mental or physical disabilities).119 But how is the court to be satisfied to the criminal standard 
that a complainant has fallen into the hands of a criminal gang with the power to intimidate 
her, when that is the very issue in dispute in the trial? A decision to deny the defence the right 
to cross examine a witness should not presuppose the truth of the very evidence the defence is 
denied the right to challenge. Consequently, as Shabir acknowledges, it may be difficult to 
establish fear without bringing the witness to court to face cross-examination about the 
genuineness of their fear – although the court also acknowledges that in some types of case, 
(which may well be thought to include human trafficking) this is undesirable.120 It would be 
hard to devise a less satisfactory way of upholding the rights of both witnesses and defendants. 
In R v Ali,121 the defendants were alleged to have transported young teenage girls, after 
a period of grooming, relatively short distances to out-of-the way places where, having been 
plied with alcohol, they were sexually assaulted or raped. One important point established by 
the Court of Appeal’s judgment is that such brief ‘transport’ can constitute trafficking, and the 
judgment is also important for what it says about the meaning of ‘consent’ under the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003. The evidential issue in this case was that the ABE interview of a teenage 
girl, ‘GB’, was admitted as hearsay evidence on the ground that she was in fear. The evidence 
of fear was a social worker’s statement that GB ‘had said she was scared about going to court 
and the thought of coming to court gave her more pain and stress than the actual incident and 
[the social worker’s] opinion was that [GB] had been emotionally traumatised by the whole 
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116 [2012] EWCA Crim 2564, [64]. 
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event and added to her childhood experiences when she was aged three.’122 This is a classic 
case of a witness at risk of secondary victimisation and given the express statutory requirement 
that ‘fear’ be widely construed,123 the judge and the Court of Appeal were clearly right to treat 
the social worker’s statement as evidence that GB was in fear. It is difficult, however, to see 
how it could constitute sufficient evidence to prove fear to the criminal standard. Opinion 
evidence based on hearsay evidence from the very witness the defence sought to portray as 
highly unreliable cannot be sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the traumatic nature 
of the incident about which GB would have had to testify.124 The Court of Appeal in fact made 
no reference to the standard of proof but simply held that fear was ‘established’.125 The Court 
could and should have done better than to fudge the issue in this way. 
 One option open to the Court of Appeal would have been to state clearly that what was 
said in Shabir about the standard of proof was obiter and should not be followed. The point 
does not appear to have been argued in Shabir and the court expressly states that the part of the 
judgment dealing with the proof of fear is not among the grounds for its decision.126  Although 
some commentators assert that there is a general principle that all preliminary matters which 
the prosecution seeks to prove must be proved to the criminal standard,127 this principle is not 
firmly established in case law. The strongest authority for it is Lord Hughes JSC’s judgment in 
Misick v R,128 but not only is the Privy Council’s acceptance of the principle clearly obiter, but 
Lord Hughes is at pains to point out that the earlier authorities for it were either confined to 
specific situations,129 or were dicta on points that had not apparently been argued. 130  
Australian, Canadian and New Zealand courts which have considered the general issue of 
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principle have all concluded that in general the appropriate standard of proof is the civil one,131  
although Canada and New Zealand, unlike Australia, make an exception for the voluntariness 
of confessions.132 
There is much to be said for adopting the civil standard of proof for most preliminary 
issues, including that of whether a witness is in fear, but this raises wide issues beyond the 
scope of this article.133 What we want to suggest here is that it would be in keeping with a 
victim-centred due process approach to admit the hearsay evidence in Ali even on the 
assumption that fear must be proved to the criminal standard. 
What the court should have done, we suggest, was to hold that even if the evidence was 
not admissible through the ‘fear’ gateway, it was admissible in the interests of justice under s 
114(1)(d). The Court of Appeal has stressed on a number of occasions that s 114(1)(d) should 
not be used to circumvent the requirements of the specific gateways,134 and has also urged 
caution in using the discretion to protect witnesses on grounds that assume what the prosecution 
needs to prove.135 If the fear gateway cannot be passed unless fear is proved to the criminal 
standard, it would be wrong to hold that a lesser degree of proof was sufficient in itself to 
establish that the interests of justice required the hearsay to be admitted. The issue in Ali was 
not, however, simply whether the witness was in fear. Rather, the court should have focussed 
on the risk that the complainant would actually be traumatised by having to relive her 
experience. No prejudgment of guilt is involved in finding that there is a risk that the events 
the witness would have to describe may have been so traumatic that she would suffer secondary 
victimisation by having to relive them. Such a risk may exist whether or not the complainant 
is in a subjective state of fear. It is more serious than a mere reluctance to relive distressing 
past experiences, which has been held insufficient to justify admission under s 114(1)(d).136 It 
is incumbent on courts to protect witnesses against secondary victimisation, while giving them 
a fair opportunity for their stories to be heard, provided that this is consistent with the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. In a case such as Ali, it is in the interests of justice to admit the 
hearsay evidence provided there are sufficient opportunities for the defendant to challenge it. 
Similarly, s 114(1)(d) could be used in the situation where complainants claim that they 
or their families have been threatened by the defendants and their associates, but it would be 
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premature to find this proved to the criminal standard at the admissibility stage. The reason for 
admitting the evidence in the interests of justice would not be the witnesses’ subjective state of 
fear, but the risks that they or their families would face should it turn out that the defendants 
really were members of a violent criminal organisation. As in Doorson, this could be justified 
on the basis of what is known about the common methods of this type or organised crime, 
without any prejudgement of the guilt of the particular defendants. 
 
Conclusion 
We have examined a number of situations where, in theory, the rules of evidence appear to 
pose serious problems for the prosecution of human trafficking cases. The qualification ‘in 
theory’ is important, because what we have also seen (particularly in Rehman and Ali) is that 
the Court of Appeal is quite capable of fudging the issue so as to avoid decisions that would 
seem harsh from the perspective of the alleged victim. What we do not know is how often 
similar fudges are applied at first instance. Nor do we know how far the ‘law in the books’ 
influences prosecutorial decisions. This ignorance as to how the technicalities of evidence law 
are reflected in practice is a problem not just for the study of human trafficking prosecutions 
but for evidence scholarship in general, and it can be remedied only be empirical research.     
  In a human rights perspective, criminal trials for serious offences should be seen not 
simply as crime control measures – though they do have a part to play within a wider strategy 
to reduce crime – but as the forum in which the state seeks to fulfil its duty towards those whose 
human rights have been violated by crime, by proving the guilt of an offender in a fair trial in 
which the victim is afforded a fair opportunity to participate.137 It is essential to a fair trial that 
the defendant must be able to adduce evidence that is of substantial probative value, and raise 
questions that potentially afford grounds for reasonable doubt, even if that evidence or those 
questions may be distressing to the alleged victim. However, the right of victims to be protected 
against secondary victimisation may afford compelling grounds for limiting the defendant’s 
‘right to confrontation’ provided there are what the ECtHR calls ‘sufficient counterbalancing 
factors’138 to ensure a fair trial. The weaknesses that commonly exist in the evidence of alleged 
trafficking victims, such as inconsistent or false previous statements and motives to present 
themselves as victims, will very often be ones that can be amply demonstrated to the court 
without needing to cross-examine the complainant. The recent report from the CPS 
Inspectorate highlights the use of the hearsay provisions, alongside other ways of bringing 
prosecutions without victim-witnesses, as form of good practice that needs to be used more 
effectively.139 There is scope for some flexibility in the courts’ response to such applications. 
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